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CASE NOTES

that of the welfare recipient whom the Court favored with a pretermination
hearing in Goldberg.
The holding in Eldridge is troubling. While not the first major case
since Goldberg to deny a predeprivation hearing,5 4 the decision in Eldridge
appears to presage a significant departure from the Court's recent concern
with the rights of individuals in social welfare cases. The decision to deny
a hearing to disability benefits recipients invites new challenges to the constitutionality of a summary termination of disability benefits and to the
Court's sense of procedural due process.
William R. Crow, Jr.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE--Evidence-Accomplice TestimonyTestimony of Accessory After the Fact
Need Not Be Corroborated
Easter v. State,
536 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
Wilmer Easter was convicted of murdering his ten month old daughter. At
trial, the State relied heavily on his wife's uncorroborated testimony, and the
court overruled his requested instruction'to submit to the jury the issue of
whether his wife, who had temporarily concealed the crime, was an accomplice witness. Easter contended on appeal that the court erred in refusing
his instruction, urging that his wife was an accessory, and therefore an
accomplice witness, which necessitated corroboration of her testimony.
Held-Affirmed. An accessory is not an accomplice witness, and his
uncorroborated testimony alone may support another's conviction.'
The statutory requirement of corroboration of an accomplice witness'
testimony has long been in effect in Texas. 2 Although the Court of
Criminal Appeals at an early date adopted a broad definition of the term
54. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611 (1974) (pretermination hearing
held unnecessary where full and immediate posttermination hearing provided).
1. Easter v. State, 536 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
2. Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 718 (1925); Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 781 (1895). The
current statute, TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14 (1965), provides: "A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other
evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense."

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 8 [2022], No. 2, Art. 11

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8

"accomplice witness," 8 its interpretation disregarded the definition of "accomplice" found in the Penal Codes then in effect. 4 The enactment of the
1974 Texas Penal Code revised the law concerning parties to offenses,
setting forth a separate statute for accessorial conduct. 6 As a result, under
the generally adopted test for determining whether a witness is subject to the
corroboration rule, the court in Easter v. State7 was confronted with
interpreting the effect of the new Penal Code provisions on the procedural

corroboration statute.
The rationale underlying the distrust and suspicion which has surrounded.
accomplice testimony had its basis in the theory that one accused of criminal
activity may seek to procure clemency or immunity from the state by
assisting in the conviction of others.8 Even where no immunity or clemency
had been promised, hope or expectation of procuring it was generally
3. Williams v. State, 53 Tex. Crim. 396, 399, 110 S.W. 63, 64 (1908). In Williams, the court held that an accomplice, for purposes of the corroboration rule, included
principals, accomplices, accessories, and all participes criminis; that the term had a
broader meaning for evidentiary purposes than was given in the then existing penal statutes; that it meant, generally, anyone connected with the crime by unlawful act or omission occurring before, at the time of, or after the offense, regardless of whether he was
present or participated in the crime. Id. at 399, 100 S.W. at 64; acccord, Singletary
v. State, 509 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Johnson v. State, 502 S.W.2d
761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Gausman v. State, 478 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1972); King v.State, 135 Tex. Crim. 513, 515, 121 S.W.2d 338, 339 (1938); see
Chappell v.State, 519 S.W.2d 453, 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Brown v.State, 505
S.W.2d 850, 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
4. The wording of Tex. Pen. Code art. 79 (1895) was identical to that of Tex.
Pen. Code art. 70 (1925), which provided:
An accomplice is one who is not present at the commission of an offense, but who,
before the- act is done, advises, commands or encourages another to commit the
offense; or
Who agrees with the principal offender to aid him in committing the offense,
though he may not have given such aid; or,
Who promises any reward, favor or other inducement, or threatens any injury in
order to procure the commission of the offense; or,
Who prepares arms or aid of any kind, prior to the commission of an offense, for
the purpose of assisting the principal in the execution of the same.
5. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.01-.02 (1974).
6. Id. § 38.05, which provides:
(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to hinder the arrest, prosecution,
conviction, or punishment of another for an offense, he:
(1) harbors or conceals the other;
(2) provides or aids in providing the other with any means of avoiding
arrest or effecting escape; or
(3) warns the other of impending discovery or apprehension.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
7. 536 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
8. Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893, 896 (Alas.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 56 (1961);
State v. Spruill, 106 A.2d 278, 280 (N.J. 1954); 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2057 at
322 (3d ed. 1940). One court, in discussing the suspicion surrounding an accomplice
witness, characterized the extension of leniency as "bribery." Newman v. State, 334
N,E.2d 684, 686-87 (Ind. 1975),
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suspected as being sufficient to motivate an accused who faced severe
penalties to falsely testify against others in order to win the state's favor.9
Parties to crime in the modern common law were labeled as either
principals or accessories. 10 A principal was either of the first or second
degree.II An accessory, generally one who aided or encouraged the
principal at a time or place other than that of the offense, was classified as
the aid or encourageeither before or after the fact, depending upon when
12
ment was given in relation to the crime's commission.
There was a significance to the distinction between accessories before and
after the fact. The modern common law recognized a lesser degree of
culpability on the part of an accessory after the fact,"13 defining such a
person as one who, knowing that a felony had been committed by another,
intentionally shielded the felon from the law. 14 Additionally, while in the
older common law an accessory after the fact was punished as a principal, in
more recent times penalties have been reduced."'
Common law treatment of the term "accomplice" has been varied and
confusing. Generally, it applied to all persons concerned with the commission of the offense, whether they were principals in the first or second degree
or accessories before or after the fact.' 6 The term was used generally to
describe principals and accessories when discussing parties to crime and
competency or admissibility of their testimony. In early practice little
distinction was necessary when using the term in a cautionary instruction,
for accessories after the fact, punishable as principals, evoked the same
distrust of the court because of a suspected motivation to procure clemency.

17

As punishments became less harsh and accessories after the fact were
distinguished in degree of culpability from principals, definitions began to
9. E.g., People v. Leemon, 328 N.E.2d 645, 648 (Ill. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Guy,

105 N.W.2d 892, 896 (Minn. 1960); State v. Nice, 401 P.2d 296, 297 (Ore. 1965); see
7 J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2057 at 322 (3d ed. 1940).
10. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 324 (4th ed. 1972).
11. Id. A principal of the first degree was one who actually did the act, and a principal of the second degree was one who, while actually or constructively present during
the crime's commission, aided, encouraged, or abetted another in committing a crime.
Id. at 326-27. There was little legal significance to this distinction, as prosecution of
either could proceed independent of the other, and punishments were usually identical.
See id. at 325-26.
12. Id. at 323-24.
13. See People v. Jordan, 91 N.E. 482, 484 (Ill. 1910).
14. Skelly v. United States, 76 F.2d 483, 487 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S.

757 (1935).
15. R. PERKINS,

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

326 (4th ed. 1972).

16. See Tomlinson v. United States, 93 F.2d 652, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 646 (1938); State v. Quinlan, 41 N.W. 299, 300 (Minn. 1889). See generally 23 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 786(1) (1961).
17. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 326 (4th ed. 1972); 7 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2058 at 325 (3d ed. 1940).
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vary"' according to the differing views regarding the degree of criminal
involvement necessary for one to be an accomplice. 19 A few jurisdictions,
including Texas, distinguished between the terms "accomplice" and "accomplice witness," holding the latter to have a broader meaning. 20 The
problem of determining whether accessories after the fact fall within the
meaning of "accomplice" as used in the corroboration rule has usually been
solved by invoking the general rule that unless one could be indicted for the
same offense for which the person aided was on trial, he could not be an
21
accomplice witness.
Because the common law rule required only a cautionary instruction as to
the credibility of accomplice testimony, 22 many jurisdictions have effected
by statute the requirement of corroborative evidence. 2a Most of these
statutes retain the common law term "accomplice" as it was used in the
cautionary instruction, 24 though a few define it in terms of principals,
accessories, or other participants to crime. 25 Subsequent judicial interpreta18. Compare Mills v. State, 17 S.E.2d 719, 724 (Ga. 1941), with Rector v. State,
17 P.2d 519 (Okla. Crim. App. 1932), and State v. Turnbow, 193 P. 485, 487-88 (Ore.
1920). See generally 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 786(1) (1961).
19. Compare State v. Johnson, 165 N.E.2d 814, 824 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960) (one
must have freely and voluntarily engaged with another in commission -of crime), with
Palmer v. State, 228 P.2d 391, 392 (Okla. Crim. App. 1951) (one need only have been
culpably implicated in commission of crime charged), and Gausman v. State, 478 S.W.2d
458, 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (person connected with crime by unlawful act or
omission).
20. See People v. Basch, 365 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838-39 (1975); Williams v. State, 53
Tex. Crim. 396, 399, 110 S.W. 63, 64 (1908). Contra, State v. Weston, 219 P. 180,
186 (Ore. 1923).
21. E.g., Kearce v. State, 172 S.E. 643, 644 (Ga. 1934); State v. Jones, 88 N.W.
196, 198 (Iowa 1901); State v. Edlund, 160 P. 534, 535 (Ore. 1916); accord,. Gordon
v. State, 533 P.2d 25, 30 (Alas. 1975); State v. Johnson, 139 N.W.2d 232, 236 (S.D.
1965).
22. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917); United States v. Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Cady, 495 F.2d 742, 745 (8th
Cir. 1974). About half of the states, having no statute requiring an accomplice's corroboration, still follow the common law rule that accomplice testimony may be less
worthy of belief, but it need not be corroborated. E.g., Rich v. State, 322 So. 2d 468,
469 (Miss. 1975); Commonwealth v. Tervalon, 345 A.2d 671, 677-78 (Pa. 1975);
Kutchera v. State, 230 N.W.2d 750, 758 (Wis. 1975).
23. To date, almost one-half of the states have such statutes. E.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1111 (Deering 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-121 (1974); MINN. STAT. § 634.04
(1945); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 60:22 (McKinney 1971). There is no comparable
federal statute, and none of the federal courts now requires corroboration. E.g., United
States v. Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Micciche, 525 F.2d
544, 546 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Beasley, 519 F.2d 233, 242 (5th Cir. 1975).
But see United States v. Cravero, 530 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1976) (corroboration not
required unless testimony unbelievable on its face).
24. E.g.; GA. CODE ANN. § 38-121 (1974); MINN. STAT. § 634.04 (1945); TEx.
CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 38.14 (1965).
25. E.g., CAL. PENMA CODE § 1111 (Deering 1976) ("indictability" test); Morr.
REv. CODES ANN. § 95-3012 (Supp. 1975) (persons legally responsible for same crime);
N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 60.22 (McKinney 1971) (persons who participated in offense
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ions almost invariably have excluded accessories after the fact from the
definition of an accomplice within their jurisdictions' statutes requiring
corroboration of an accomplice witness. 26 Only a small minority of jurisdictions specifically included accessories after the fact in the definition, primari-,
ly through judicial construction of statutes which made accessories after the
27
fact punishable as principals.
Since 1895, the Texas Codes of Criminal Procedure have required that
the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated. 28 Despite distinctions
between "accomplice" and "accessory," 29 Texas courts repeatedly held that,
for purposes of the corroboration rule, the term "accomplice" included
accessories after the fact.80 It is of significance that while those codes were
in effect, "accomplices" were punishable by the same penalty as were
principals,3' and "accessories" were punishable only to the extent of the,
82
lowest penalty to which the principal would have been liable.
The 1974 Penal Code, however, significantly changed the law relating to
parties to crime, particularly with respect to accessorial conduct. 3 3 It
abolished the distinction between principals and accomplices,3 4 effectively
charged or offense based on same or some of same facts or conduct constituting offense
charged). The practice commentary to the New York statute takes the position that
the "indictability" test is too restrictive and at odds with the purpose of the doctrine.
Denzer, PracticeCommentary, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 60.22 (McKinney 1971).
26. See, e.g., People v. Tewksbury, 127 Cal. Rptr. 135, 140 (1976); Ford v. State,
207 S.E.2d 494, 499 (Ga. 1974); State v. Swyningan, 229 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Minn. 1975);
Edmondson v. State, 532 P.2d 81, 84 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
27. Odom v. State, 533 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Ark. 1976); Singletary v. State, 509
S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); State v. Callaway, 267 P.2d 970, 979 (Wyo..
1954) (cautionary rule only); cf. People v. Basch, 365 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838 (1975) (by,
inference rejecting "indictability" test). Effective January 1, 1976, Arkansas repealed:
its statutes enabling punishment of accessories after the fact as principals. Ark. Acts
1975, No. 928, § 3. The replacing statutes separately proscribe after the fact accessorial
conduct under a hindering statute, thus placing into doubt the validity of the past cases,
with regard to an accessory after the fact being an accomplice witness. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-2805 (Supp. 1976).
28. TEx. CODE CrM. PRoc. AN4. art. 38.14 (1965); Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 718
(1925); Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 781 (1895).
29. Tex. Pen. Code arts. 70, 77 (1925); Tex. Pen. Code arts. 79, 86 (1895). When
one compares Tex. Pen. Code art. 70 (1925) with 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*36-37, it will be seen that the definition of "accomplice" followed generally the common law definition of an accessory before the fact. Likewise, when one compares Tex.
Pen. Code art. 77 (1925) with 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *37-38, it will be evident that the definition of "accessory" followed very closely the common law definition
of an accessory after the fact.
30. E.g., Singletary v. State, 509 S.W.2d 572, 575. (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Wade
v. State, 367 S.W.2d 337, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963); Orr v. State, 124 Tex. Crim.,
252, 257, 61 S.W.2d 490, 492 (1933); Williams v. State, 53 Tex. Crim. 396, 399, 110
S.W. 63, 64 (1908).
31. Tex. Pen. Code art. 72 (1925); Tex. Pen. Code art. 81 (1895).
32. Tex. Pen. Code art. 79 (1925); Tex. Pen. Code art. 88 (1895).
33. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.01-.02, 38.05 (1974).
34. Id. § 7.01(c).
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making a common law accessory before the fact a principal chargeable with
the commission of the offense.8 5 Additionally, it included a provision
which, according to the court in Easter,"6 makes the conduct of a common
law accessory after the fact a separate offense punishable as a class A
misdemeanor in all cases.8 7 This provision, however, falls short of encompassing the conduct of accessories after the fact as formerly defined in Texas
and at common law by not requiring knowledge by the defendant that the
person he aided had committed a crime.38
The legislature, which deleted the definition of "accomplice" from the
penal laws of the state, should have foreseen the potential ambiguity which
was to result when attempting to implement the accomplice corroboration
rule found in article 38.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The
explanation for this oversight may be the legislature's observation that the
Court of Criminal Appeals, in applying the corroboration rule up to that
time, had not followed the Penal Code's definition of "accomplice," but had
instead used their own broader "accomplice witness" interpretation.3 9 Regardless of the cause, the absence of adequate statutory definitions in the
1974 Penal Code, coupled with the lack of coordination between the
applicable provisions of the 1974 'Penal Code and existing Code of Criminal
Procedure, provided a clear opportunity for the court to bring Texas within
the majority rule that an accessory after the fact is not an accomplice
witness.
In Easter v. State40 the court took advantage of that opportunity by
holding that an accessory after the fact no longer falls within the definition of
an accomplice witness. 4 1 The court's rationale was based upon the test
already used in a majority of jurisdictions for determining whether a witness
is an accomplice witness under the procedural corroboration statute. This
test, the use of which in Texas the court said was "well settled, ' 4 2 is known
as the "indictability" test, and it makes the corroboration requirement
dependent on whether the witness could be indicted and convicted of the
35. Compare TEx. PENAL CODE
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *36-37.

ANN. §§ 7.01(a), 7.02(a)(2) (1974), with 4 W.

36. Easter v. State, 536 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
37. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.05 (1974), with 4 W.

BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES *37-38.
38. Searcy & Patterson, Practice Commentary, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.05

(1974); see Easter v. State, 536 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Clark v.

State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 194, 261 S.W.2d 339, 344, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855 (1953).
Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.05 (1974), with Tex. Pen. Code art. 77 (1925),
and 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *37.

39. See cases cited note 30 supra.

40. 536 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).

41. Id. at 228-29.

42. Id. at 227. The court supported this conclusion with two older Texas cases and

several cases from other jurisdictions. Id. at 227.
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crime for which the accused was being tried. 43 By citing Liegois v. State,4 4
which had relied on substantially the same test, the court implied that the
test had been continuously in effect in Texas. 45 A closer examination of
more recent case law would have revealed, however, a slight but significant
46
difference in the state of the law.
First, the test relied on by the court has not been used consistently in
Texas. The test more frequently used defined an accomplice witness as one
who, as a principal, an accomplice, or an accessory, was connected with the
crime by unlawful act or omission on his part, transpiring before, at, or
after the commission of the offense, whether or not he was present and
participated in the crime. 4 7 In 1972, when the court mentioned the
"indictability" test, it indicated that the test was not an all-inclusive one,
inferring that others who may not meet its requirements may still fall within
the definition of an accomplice witness.4 8 Since principals, accomplices,
and accessories were all indictable under the former penal provisions, 49 the
use of "indictability" seems to have been a logical result of the definition
already in use.50 Texas cases have not indicated that "indictability" alone
was either the source of the term's definition or the controlling factor in
problems involving interpretation.
The "indictability" test, as used in Texas, was not whether the accessory
could have been tried for the same offense for which the aided person was
on trial. Instead, it was whether the witness could be tried as a principal, an
accomplice, or an accessory to the crime for which the aided person was
being tried.51 Accomplice witnesses were repeatedly held to be those who
52
could be tried under the old penal codes as accessories to the person aided.
43. Id. at 227-29.

The inference is that the complicity of a witness indictable for

a lesser crime, hence his potential punishment and consequent motivation to avoid punishment, is not of such a degree as to justify suspicion of the veracity of his testimony.
See id. at 227-29.
44. 73 Tex. Crim. 142, 164 S.W. 382 (1914).

45. Easter v. State, 536 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
46. See cases cited note 30 supra.
47. Singletary v. State, 509 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Brown v.
State, 505 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Johnson v. State, 502 S.W.2d 761,
763 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Gausman v. State, 478 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972); Williams v. State, 53 Tex. Crim. 396, 399, 110 S.W. 63, 64 (1908).
48. Gausman v. State, 478 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) where the
court said, "[flrequently, the test . . . is . . . ." (emphasis added). Id. at 460.
49. Tex. Pen. Code arts. 65, 72, 79 (1925).

50. See Gausman v. State, 478 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Williams
v. State, 53 Tex. Crim. 396, 399, 110 S.W. 63, 64 (1908).
51. Williams v. State, 464 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Devault v.
State, 449 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). Indictments were required to accu-

rately allege the accused's status. Jones v. State, 505 S.W.2d 903, 906-07 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1974).
52. E.g., Singletary v. State, 509 S.W.2d 572, 575-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Ysasaga v. State, 444 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Welch v. State, 153 Tex.
Crim. 416, 418, 219 S.W.2d 804, 805 (1949).
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These same persons, under the 1974 Penal Code, are still liable to prosecution, the only difference being that they may be tried under a different
section than that under which principals are tried. 58 The court's basing of
its rationale on this technical, "separate offense" distinction is questionable
since there were also separate articles in the old penal codes, each of which
independently proscribed the conduct of principals, accomplices, and accessories. 54 Accessories after the fact were not technically chargeable for the
same offense as the principal even under the old codes; instead, they were
chargeable as accessories to the particular crime. 55
A difference between the old and new statutes which may
be relevant to
the corroboration rule's rationale56 and which may justify the court's distinction is that the punishment for an accessory was the same or similar as that
for the principal under the old codes, 57 while it is different (usually less)
under the new code. 58 Whether the difference in severity of punishment
alone should remove the requirement of corroboration is at least arguable,
however, since the requirement of corroboration arises out of suspicion of
accomplice testimony because of the accomplice's fear of being punished, not
necessarily his fear of receiving the same punishment received by the
principal.
The "indictability" test's logic has been attacked in a few decisions. 59 For
example, a New Jersey case, State v. Spruill,6" reversing the lower court
opinion which was relied upon in Easter,"' calls attention to the underlying
rationale justifying the corroboration requirement: the witness' interest in
and his ability to influence the outcome of the litigation arouses suspicion of
accomplice testimony.6 2 That the witness is punishable for his complicity
and may try to win immunity or leniency in exchange for his testimony
would seem to be the more logical and dispositive consideration, not whether
he is subject to indictment or information under the same penal article as is
53. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.05 (1974).
54. Tex. Pen. Code arts. 65, 70, 77 (1925); Tex. Pen. Code arts. 74, 79, 86 (1895).
55. Jones v. State, 505 S.W.2d 903, 906-07 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Weaver v.
State, 112 Tex. Crim. 546, 548, 17 S.W.2d 1066, 1067-68 (1929).
56. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
57. Tex. Pen. Code art. 79 (1925); Tex. Pen. Code art. 88 (1895).
58. Under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.05(c) (1974), an accessory is punishable

always as a class A misdemeanant.
59. Egan v. United States, 287 F. 958, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (cautionary instruction); State v. Spruill, 106 A.2d 278, 281-82 (N.J. 1954) (cautionary instruction).
60. 106 A.2d 278 (N.J. 1954).
61. Easter v. State, 536 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
62. State v. Spruill, 106 A.2d 278, 281 (N.J. 1954). Holding the state's witnesses,
who had been indicted only for other related offenses, to have been accomplice witnesses
for purposes of the cautionary instruction, the New Jersey Supreme Court said, "[Ilegal

discretion does not mean arbitrary action, but judgment reasonably exercised .... ." Id.
at 282. The Easter court's use of Spruill in supporting the adoption of the "indictability" test is, therefore, questionable,

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol8/iss2/11

8

McQuarrie: Testimony of Accessory after the Fact Need Not Be Corroborated.

11976]

CASE NOTES

the principal against whom he testifies. Several courts have voiced similar
reasoning, requiring complicity in only some part of the offense by an accomplice witness. 63 The majority of the courts in the country have, however,
employed the "indictability" test in excluding accessories after the fact from
64
the category of accomplice witnesses.
An inconsistency in the logic of the Easter decision arises from an aspect
of the "indictability" test's past use in Texas. Formerly, by statute certain
persons because of their domestic status could not be charged as accessories.6 5 By judicial decision, however, those same persons were held to be
accomplice witnesses during the same period that the well-settled "indictability" test was supposedly in effect in Texas.6 6 It does not, therefore, appear
that Texas saw a need to adhere rigidly to the test. The court in Easter was
non-committal toward the prior validity of those cases but concluded that
they were "no longer viable." 67 Whatever their present viability, their mere
existence illustrates the error of the court's expression of what the test
formerly has been in Texas.
The effect of the unqualified adoption of the test is ironically to be found
in the opinion itself, where the court distinguishes between "accomplice" and
"accomplice witness," saying that the latter has a "much broader meaning."'6 8 The obvious effect of the decision, however, is to restrict the
meaning of an accomplice witness to common law principals and accessories
before the fact.6 9 Since common law accessories before the fact were
statutorily designated in Texas as accomplices, the court's holding in Easter
effectively redefines an accomplice witness as one who was, under the old
penal codes, either a principal or an accomplice. 70 The "broader meaning"
referred to in the opinion is thus ignored. "Indictability" is now apparently
71
the exclusive test for determining whether one is an accomplice witness. It
63. The inference is that the punishments faced by accomplice witnesses for the
lesser crimes with which they were chargeable, though less than those faced by the principal against whom they testified, were nevertheless sufficient to warrant suspicion of
their motivations in testifying for the state. Egan v. United States, 287 F. 958, 964
(D.C. Cir. 1923) (cautionary instruction); People v. Basch, 365 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838
(1975) (corroboration); see Odom v. State, 533 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Ark. 1976) (corroboration); State v. Callaway, 267 P.2d 970, 979 (Wyo. 1954) (cautionary instruction),
64. Cases cited note 21 supra. New York recently rejected the "indictability" test
as too restrictive and not consistent with the corroboration rule's underlying rationale.
See Denzer, Practice Commentary, N.Y. CUM. PRoc. LAw § 60.22 (McKinney 1971).
65. Tex. Pen. Code art. 78 (1925).
66. Reynolds v. State, 489 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Jones v. State,
160 Tex. Crim. 479, 481, 272 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1954); see Gonzales v. State, 441 S.W.
2d 539, 540-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
67. Easter v. State, 536 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
68. Id. at 227 n.4.
69. Compare Easter v. State, 536 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), with
Tax.PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.01(a), 7.02(a) (2)(1974).
70. See Easter v.State, 536 S.W.2d 223, 227-29 (Tex.Crim. App. 1976).
71. See id. at 227-29.
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-follows that an accomplice witness would be defined as anyone falling within
the purview of section 7.01 of the 1974 Penal Code. The court, however,
72
specifically refused to draw this conclusion.
An additional question of interpretation results from the court's construction of section 38.05 of the Penal Code, which sets out the separate offense of hindering apprehension or prosecution. 73 That section attempts
to combine under the same heading the conduct of an accessory after
.the fact with that of someone who interferes with the administration of
justice.7 4 The court noted that under section 38.05 knowledge that a crime
has been committed by the aided person is not required of an individual in
order for him to be subject to the section. 75 In actuality, a mere intent to
aid the person in avoiding the legal consequences of his conduct, which infers
a -requirement of knowledge of either wrongdoing or an accusation of
wrongdoing, is sufficient. 76 For one to be an accessory after the fact at
common law, however, one must have had knowledge that the person aided
77
had committed a crime.
Without challenging the legitimacy of the need to reserve unto the judicial
system the resolution of criminal accusations, the question nonetheless
remains whether section 38.05 was intended to include in the same category
an accessory after the fact and one who hinders an arrest. The court's
interpretation of the statute places in the same category a person who, as an
accessory after the fact, assists a murderer in disposing of the body in an
attempt to conceal the crime and one who hinders the arrest of another
whom he believes has been falsely accused.78 The old statutory definition
of accessory, a term which has previously been used in defining "accomplice
witness," required knowledge of a crime's commission. 79 Since, according to
the court in Easter, the language of section 38.05 requires none, whether the
statute proscribes what was formerly known in Texas as accessorial conduct
is unclear. Nevertheless, using the "separate offense" theory (wherein an
accessory would not be indictable for the same offense and thus fail the
"indictability" test), it was this questionable section upon which the court in
part based its holding, although it failed to attach any significance to the
80
language regarding the section's adequacy.
Many jurisdictions expressly require that an accessory must first have had
72. Id. at 229.
73. TaX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.05 (1974).
74. Id.
75. Easter v. State, 536 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
76. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.*§§ 6.02(a), 6.03(a), 38.05(a) (1974).
77. Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 194, 261 S.W.2d 339, 344, cert. denied, 346
U.S. 855 (1953); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *37.
78. See Easter v. State, 536 S.W.2d 223, 228-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
79. Tex. Pen. Code art. 77 (1925).
80, Easter v. State, 536 S.W,2d 223, 229 (Tex, Crim. App. 1976).
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knowledge that another has committed a crime.81 While there is no
authority concerning the legislative intent of section 38.05, it is quite possible
that it was intended to include both accessories and hinderers within the
same category, and that they are to be similarly punishable.8 2 If that is so,
the separate offense aspect of the court's reasoning would not be unsound by
reason of the uncertainty surrounding the adequacy of section 38.05.
Given the ambiguous and indefinite relation between article 38.14 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure and sections 7.01 and 38.05 of the Penal Code,
the court in Easter capitalizes on the opportunity to bring Texas within the
majority of jurisdictions regarding who an accomplice may be within the rule
requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony. Its utilization of the widely
used "indictabiity" test, however, without even discussing the underlying
rationale that serves as the justification for the corroboration rule, necessitates legislative action. Whether the test, while easily and conveniently
applied, adheres to the long-established reasons which justify article 38.14
and whether it best serves the ends of justice are questions which, having
been ignored by the court, deserve careful scrutiny.
The problem precipitated by the legislature's amending the Penal Code
would, of course, be nonexistent were article 38.14 to contain, for purposes
of that article's application, a definition of "accomplice."
A measure
including such a definition would avoid the uncertainty resulting from
revision of the Penal Code sections pertaining to parties to crime. Confusion
could easily be avoided by following the procedural example of some
jurisdictions that have added to their corroboration statutes a paragraph
which defines who, for purposes of those statutes, is an accomplice.8 3 While
so doing, a close examination of the validity and extent of applicability of the
deep-rooted justifications for the rule requiring corroboration of accomplice
witnesses would well serve as a guide to ensure the best result. "
A clarification of section 38.05 as to what guilty knowledge is required of
a person accused under that article is also essential to resolve the problems
which arise in Easter.8 4 The determinative question in that effort lies in
81. E.g., Fajeriak v. State, 439 P.2d 783, 789 n.17 (Alas.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
881 (1968); 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1970); LA. REv. STAT. § 14:25 (1974) (knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-1-5 (1972). But see N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 205.50, .55, .60, .65 (,McKinney 1975) (hinging punishment on extent of accomplice's knowledge and type of crime committed by person receiving aid of accomplice).
82. See Searcy & Patterson, Practice Commentary, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 38.05 (1974).

83. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111 (Deering 1976) (one indictable for same offense); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-3012 (Supp. 1975) (persons legally responsible
for same crime); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 60.22 (McKinney 1971) (persons who participated in offense charged or offense based on same or some of same facts or conduct
constituting offense charged).
84. Because intent implies knowledge of some form, the type of knowledge should
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